Kant's Critique of Judgment has often been interpreted by scholars as comprising separate treatments of three uneasily connected topics: beauty, biology, and empirical knowledge. Rachel Zuckert's book interprets the Critique as a unified argument concerning all three domains. She argues that on Kant's view, human beings demonstrate a distinctive cognitive ability in appreciating beauty and understanding organic life: an ability to anticipate a whole that we do not completely understand according to preconceived categories. This ability is necessary, moreover, for (...) human beings to gain knowledge of nature in its empirical character as it is, not as we might assume it to be. Her wide-ranging and original study will be valuable for readers in all areas of Kant's philosophy. (shrink)

Classifying Madness (Springer, 2005) concerns philosophical problems with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, more commonly known as the D.S.M. The D.S.M. is published by the American Psychiatric Association and aims to list and describe all mental disorders. The first half of Classifying Madness asks whether the project of constructing a classification of mental disorders that reflects natural distinctions makes sense. Chapters examine the nature of mental illness, and also consider whether mental disorders fall into natural kinds. The (...) second half of the book addresses epistemic worries. Even supposing a natural classification system to be possible in principle, there may be reasons to be suspicious of the categories included in the D.S.M. I examine the extent to which the D.S.M. depends on psychiatric theory, and look at how it has been shaped by social and financial factors. I aim to be critical of the D.S.M. without being antagonistic towards it. Ultimately, however, I am forced to conclude that although the D.S.M. is of immense practical importance, it is unlikely to come to reflect the natural structure of mental disorders. (shrink)

In this paper I present my proposal for the central norm governing the practice of assertion, which I call the Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion (SRNA). The critical features of this norm are that it's highly sensitive to the context of assertion, such that the requirements for warrantedly asserting a proposition shift with changes in context, and that truth is not a necessary condition for warrantedly asserting. In fact, I argue that there are some cases where a speaker may warrantedly (...) assert something she knows to be false. Only SRNA seems able to account for such cases. (shrink)

is a term introduced by Ian Hacking to refer to the kinds of people—child abusers, pregnant teenagers, the unemployed—studied by the human sciences. Hacking argues that classifying and describing human kinds results in feedback, which alters the very kinds under study. This feedback results in human kinds having histories totally unlike those of natural kinds (such as gold, electrons and tigers), leading Hacking to conclude that human kinds are radically unlike natural kinds. Here I argue that Hacking's argument fails and (...) that he has not demonstrated that human kinds cannot be natural kinds. Introduction Natural kinds Hacking's feedback mechanisms 3.1 Cultural feedback 3.2 Conceptual feedback. (shrink)

It is widely supposed that the scientists in any field use identical standards for evaluating theories. Without such unity of standards, consensus about scientific theories is supposedly unintelligible. However, the hypothesis of uniform standards can explain neither scientific disagreement nor scientific innovation. This paper seeks to show how the presumption of divergent standards (when linked to a hypothesis of dominance) can explain agreement, disagreement and innovation. By way of illustrating how a rational community with divergent standards can encourage innovation and (...) eventually reach consensus, recent developments in geophysics are discussed at some length. (shrink)

Extensive and diverse conceptual work towards developing a definition of ‘mental disorder’ was motivated by the declassification of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1973. This highly politicised event was understood as a call for psychiatry to provide assurances against further misclassification on the basis of discrimination or socio-political deviance. Today, if a definition of mental disorder fails to exclude homosexuality, then it fails to provide this safeguard against potential abuses and therefore fails to do an important part (...) of the work it was intended to do. We argue that fact-based definitions of mental disorder, relying on scientific theory, fail to offer a robust definition of mental disorder that excludes homosexuality. Definitions of mental disorder based on values do not fare better: these definitions are silent on questions about the diagnostic status of individuals in oppressive societies and over-inclusive of mental or behavioural states that happen to be negatively valued in the individual's social context. We consider the latest definition proposed for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-5 in light of these observations. We argue that definition fails to improve on these earlier deficiencies. Its inclusion in the manual may offer false reassurance against repetition of past misclassifications. We conclude with a provocation that if candidate definitions of mental disorder are unable to exclude homosexuality, it might perhaps be preferable not to attempt a definition at all. (shrink)

Choice feminism is a popular form of contemporary feminism, encouraging women to embrace the opportunities they have in life and to see the choices they make as justified and always politically acceptable. Though this kind of feminism appears at first glance to be tolerant and inspiring, its narratives also bring about a political stagnation as discussion, debate and critical judgement of the actions of others are discouraged in the face of being deemed unsupportive and a ‘bad’ feminist. Choice feminism also (...) encourages neoliberal values of individualism and consumerism, while downplaying the need for political and collective action against systematic inequalities. Yet in order to succeed in creating change for women, debate needs to occur, and not all decisions can be supported if they act to further inequality and a patriarchal status quo. In this article, I would like to argue for the continued need to engage politically with other feminists and with the status of the movement as a whole, by critiquing choice feminism and looking empirically at how discussion and dissent can be silenced by the choice narrative. The empirical data in this article will focus on online discussions of naming on marriage to illustrate the wider theoretical argument. (shrink)

I present and evaluate Johann Gottfried Herder's criticisms of Kant's account of the sublime and Herder's own theory of the sublime, as presented in his work, Kalligone. Herder's account and criticisms ought to be taken seriously, I argue, as (respectively) a non-reductive, naturalist aesthetics of the sublime, and as illuminating the metaphysical, moral, and political presuppositions underlying Kant's (and Burke's) accounts of the sublime.

I argue (contra Guyer et al.) that in the Critique of Judgment Kant espouses a formal, intentional theory of pleasure, and reconstruct Kant's arguments that this view can both identify what all pleasures have in common, and differentiate among kinds of pleasure. Through his investigation of aesthetic experience in the Critique of Judgment, I argue, Kant radically departs from his views about pleasure as mere sensation in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, and provides a view of pleasure (...) whereby we can understand pleasure itself to be ruled by an a priori principle. (shrink)

The imaginative context in which artificial intelligence is embedded remains a crucial touchstone from which to understand and critique both the histories and prospective futures of an AI-driven world. A recent article from Cave and Dihal sets out a narrative schema of four hopes and four corresponding fears associated with intelligent machines and AI. This article seeks to respond to the work of Cave and Dihal by presenting a gendered reading of this schema of hopes and fears. I offer a (...) brief genealogy of narratives which feature female automata, before turning to examine how gendered technology today—particularly AI assistants like Siri and Alexa—reproduces the historical narratives associated with intelligent machines in new ways. Through a gendered reading of the hopes and fears associated with AI, two key responses arise. First, that the affective reactions to intelligent machines cannot be readily separated where such machines are gendered female. And second, that the gendering of AI technologies today can be understood as an attempt to reconcile the opposing hopes and fears AI produces, and that this reconciliation is based on the association of such technologies with traditional notions of femininity. Critically, a gendered reading enables us to problematize the narratives associated with AI and expose the power asymmetries that lie within, and the technologies which arise out of, such narratives. (shrink)

Semifactual thinking about what might have been the same, e.g., ''even if Philip had not chosen the chocolate ice-cream sundae, he would have developed an allergic reaction'' has been neglected compared to counterfactual thinking about what might have been different, e.g., ''if only Philip had not chosen the chocolate ice-cream sundae, he would not have developed an allergic reaction''. We report the first systematic comparison of the two sorts of thinking in two experiments. The first experiment showed that counterfactual ''if (...) only'' thoughts about an antecedent event lead people to judge the event to be more causally related to the outcome, whereas semifactual ''even if'' thoughts lead people to judge the antecedent event to be less causally related to the outcome. In addition, the experiment showed that generating counterfactual ''if only'' thoughts increases emotional reactions such as regret, whereas generating semifactual ''even if'' thoughts decreases such reactions. The second experiment, along with a replication experiment, showed that when people complete ''if only'' and ''even if'' sentence stems, they focus on different alternative antecedents to the outcome: ''if only'' thoughts focus on alternatives that would undo the outcome whereas ''even if'' thoughts focus on alternatives that would not undo it, from among a set of available alternative antecedents in which either all, some, or none would undo the outcome. The implications of the results for theories of thinking about what might have been are discussed. (shrink)

Qualitative research provides rigorous methods not only for investigating behavioral or social issues, but can also be used for exploring epistemic issues related to science and its practices. There is growing scholarly awareness that important aspects of science can be best understood through qualitative analyses and cannot be captured using more traditional textual sources such as publications or archival documents or via more quantitative or formalized methodologies such as citation analysis or bibliometrics. Reflecting on our own research on the philosophy (...) of scientific practices, particularly on the role of model organisms in biology, we discuss some of the challenges associated with the design and conduct of qualitative research in the philosophy of science. We then explore three issues in more detail: The extent to which qualitative methods support the identification of media and spaces for the study of epistemic questions in science; the investigation of social structures particularly relevant to scientific practices and reasoning; and the conceptual and interpretative significance of analytic choices in empirical research on science. In closing, we reflect on the value of qualitative research methods for understanding scientific practices as ways to identify novel research directions, refine and augment philosophically motivated research questions, investigate the rationales and procedures through which particular scientific choices become ingrained in research, and question the implications of such habits as norms for what counts as “best practice” in particular scientific fields, all of which are topics that deserve more attention from philosophers and other scholars interested in scientific practices. (shrink)

Kant’s account of the sublime in the Critique of Judgment has been extremely influential, prompting extensive discussion of the psychology, affect, moral significance, and relevance to artistic representation of the sublime on his provocative view. I focus instead on Kant’s account of the mathematical sublime in connection to his theoretical critical project, namely his attempt to characterize human cognitive powers and to limit human pretensions to knowledge of the supersensible. I argue, first, that his account of the psychology of the (...) sublime is designed to explain not just its affective character, but also to address challenges concerning the coherence of an experience of something as transcending one’s cognitive abilities. Thereby, I argue moreover, Kant provides an alternative, demystifying account of mystical experiences, in which humans might take themselves to intuit that which is beyond human understanding or reason, and thus to claim that they have special cognitive access to the supersensible, transcending the limits Kant claims to establish for human cognition. Kant’s account of the mathematical sublime is not merely so reductive of mystical experience, however; it also, I suggest, describes the aesthetic of Kantian critique itself. (shrink)

This article considers a range of responses to Plato's Symposium, paying particular attention to Diotima's speech on eros and philosophy. It argues that Diotima's teachings contain resources for a relational pedagogy, but that these resources come more sharply into focus when Plato's text is read through the lens of contemporary (20th and 21st century) thinkers. The article therefore draws on the work of David Halperin, Hannah Arendt, Jean-François Lyotard and Luce Irigaray to argue that Diotima points us towards the value (...) of educative encounters as reciprocal and unpredictable events of initiation and becoming. Diotima's rhetorical emphasis on birth is shown to be especially important for refiguring pedagogical relations in terms of natality, understood as a capacity for new beginnings, and hence for reclaiming education as a potentially generative encounter, rather than one governed by the logic of reproduction. The final section of the article turns to work by Christine Battersby, bell hooks, Richard Smith and Morwenna Griffiths to resituate the discussion in relation to questions of autonomy. As a corrective to the modern bias towards the value of the autonomous individual, it argues that dependencies and unequal power relations can be a constitutive and enabling aspect of the educative process. Attention to such relations should thus form a key part of a relational pedagogy. (shrink)

This essay describes how using unsupervised topic modeling on relatively small corpuses can help scholars of literature circumvent the limitations of some existing theories of the novel. Using an example drawn from work on Victorian novelist Anthony Trollope's Barsetshire series, it argues that unsupervised topic modeling's counter-factual and retrospective reconstruction of the topics out of which a given set of novels have been created allows for a denaturalizing and unfamiliar view. In other words, topic models are fictions, and scholars of (...) literature should consider reading them as such. Drawing on one aspect of Stephen Ramsay's idea of algorithmic criticism, the essay emphasizes the continuities between “big data” methods and techniques and longer-standing methods of literary study. (shrink)

If I told you that screening technologies are iteratively transforming how people experience pregnancy and early parenting, you might take notice. If I mentioned that a new class of newborn patients was being created and that particular forms of parental vigilance were emerging, you might want to know more. If I described how the particular stories told about screening in public, combined with parents’ fierce commitment to safeguarding their children’s health, make it difficult for problematic experiences with screening to translate (...) into negative opinions about it, you would most likely be intrigued. An extensive qualitative literature documents all these social phenomena, and more, in connection with the spread of prenatal and newborn screening. So why is it, then, that commentators frequently assert that the predicted psychosocial impact of increased screening and testing associated with “the genomic revolution” has been far less severe and worthy of attention than predicted? How can or should social science “evidence” that sits outside adopted measurement conventions be considered? Why is it that summary statements about the psychosocial impact of genomic information often ignore qualitative evidence, or sideline it as relevant only for improving communication among patients, clinicians, and public health systems? This essay addresses such questions, using qualitative research on prenatal and newborn screening as a case study for illustrating the broad methodological, ideological, and dialogical issues at stake. (shrink)

This article probes the politics of the migrant caregiver/citizen-employer relationship in Palestine/israel as it unfolds within the Jewish-Israeli home. Based on interviews with migrants from the Philippines, Nepal, India and Sri Lanka and their Jewish-Israeli employers, I examine how Israel’s ethno-racially hierarchical citizenship regime and the transnational gendering and racialisation of carework manifest in this relationship. I begin by situating migrant women working as caregivers within the legal and political context of Palestine/israel, delineating how gendered constructions of the Jewish-Israeli woman (...) uphold the borders of the nation and paint non-Jewish migrant women as reproductively threatening. I then analyse two common tropes among citizen-employers in describing migrant caregivers. The first, what I term the ‘kinship trope’, characterizes them as ‘one of the family’, obscuring the ethno-racial basis of the state. I show how this trope contrasts sharply with Zionist settler colonial rhetoric portraying Jewish-Israelis as ‘one big family’. The second trope represents migrant women as individual agents of economic development and Israel as a market-driven, neoliberal society that is equally a state for all its citizens. By depicting Israel as a ‘modern’, ‘progressive’ state that is an exemplar of gender equality, this trope again masks the ethno-racial basis of citizenship, as well as gender disparities. Finally, I argue for a feminist approach to migrant carework that accounts for the ways neoliberal labour formations are mediated by gendered racisms specific to a particular state’s racial nation-building project. (shrink)

This essay is a version of a presentation given at a session of the American Academy of Religion annual meeting in 2009, celebrating the work of Cuban-American theologian and ethicist Ada María Isasi-Díaz. The author traces the development of Isasi-Díaz’s work articulating Mujerista Theology and connects it with her own work as a Filipina in the United States developing Asian/ Pacific American Feminist Theology by pointing to 1) the intellectual kinship of having been formed in similar circles and circumstances and (...) 2) the shared cultural citizenship of having emerged from a Catholicism that was the particular legacy of Spanish colonialism. Grounded in the faith lives of Latinas, Isasi-Diaz’s theo-ethical perspective grows out of a grassroots yet globally-minded Catholicism in conversation with both Feminist and Womanist theologies. She remains committed to Latinas as her primary community of accountability. (shrink)

On October 29, 2013, Texas House Bill 2 went into effect, greatly changing women’s access to an abortion in the state. This bill requires that physicians performing clinic-based abortions obtain admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic. A few months later, on January 1, 2014, the Texas Health and Safety Code was amended to include the requirement that all abortion clinics must meet the standards of an ambulatory surgical centre. These requirements will result in heavy burdens (...) for women seeking an abortion. Many clinics cannot afford the upgrade and are being forced to close down. On August 29, 2014, a Federal District Court for the Western District of Texas ruling to overturned the two proposed requirements. The court deemed them unconstitutional violations of a woman’s right to obtain an abortion recognizing that their purpose was to create obstacles for women. The ruling was appealed and the Federal Appeals Court allowed for the new regulations, forcing all but eight clinics in Texas to close their doors. Before the enactment of HB2, there were approximately 40 abortion clinics serving Texas’ population of about 26 million. The new regulations would force all except eight clinics to close down. The remaining clinics are located in four cities forcing many women to travel hundreds of miles to access them. For some, it is more feasible to leave Texas to go to an abortion clinic outside the state. Even if every woman seeking an abortion was able to travel to one of the remaining clinics, the clinics could not meet the demand. Both of these requirements, the ambulatory surgical requirement and the admitting privileges requirement, constitute an undue burden for women. But what about the physicians? These requirements also place an undue burden on physicians who want to perform abortions. For affected physicians, it is difficult or impossible to obtain admitting privileges at a nearby hospital. Many hospitals are denying these privileges to physicians because the hospitals have no interest in participating in performing abortions and gain nothing by allowing it. If the majority of abortion clinics are forced to close down, physicians who want to perform abortions would have to relocate to one of the four cities mentioned previously, or even leave the state. Women seeking an abortion have to travel to the clinic once or twice. Physicians would have to relocate permanently. Much of the focus of these rulings has been on women’s rights and what constitutes an undue burden for women. In addition to this, physician’s rights should also be considered. There have been several cases of doctors facing harassment and even death threats for performing abortions. Fear of such treatment has led to many doctors to decline to perform abortions. Doctors do not have an obligation to perform abortions but it is within their rights as physicians to do so. However, given this harsh treatment by anti-abortion groups, not a lot of doctors are willing. The new regulations will leave open clinics in four cities in Texas making it more difficult for those few doctors who want to perform abortions to do so. The new regulations impose undue burdens on women and doctors alike. On Tuesday, October 14, the Supreme Court struck down the new requirements allowing thirteen clinics in Texas to reopen. (shrink)

In this article, the authors draw on two qualitative, longitudinal studies of young people’s transitions to adulthood and how they construct these transitions over time in social, cultural and material terms. The authors focus on the hopes, anxieties and imagined futures of young women. They discuss the individualization thesis, and the contradiction for female individualization between expectations of equality and the reality of inequality between the genders. The debate is moved beyond ‘pitiful girls’ and ‘can-do girls’ by exploring how young (...) women in the UK and Finland anticipate and try to avoid being locked into the lives of adult women. (shrink)

'Hands Tied' brings together two very different films about hands: Maria Lassnig's Palmistry (1973) and Ayesha Hameed's A Rough History (of the Destruction of Fingerprints) (2016). These works are contextualised and their scope extended further by a roundtable discussion featuring participants Rachel Aumiller, Sam Dolbear, Nadine El-Enany, Amelia Groom, Clio Nicastro, Anja Sunhyun Michaelsen, and M. Ty., who discuss their relation to fate, work, pleasure, touch, and surveillance.

Many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers of the Enlightenment, such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Shaftesbury, Hume, Voltaire, and Diderot, criticized religious doctrines not only because (or when) such doctrines comprised unfounded claims to knowledge, but also because they inspired fanaticism, ensuing in sectarian violence, persecution, torture, and war. In this paper, I attempt to reconstruct Kant’s position, as part of this Enlightenment project: he too repeatedly and pejoratively characterizes various forms of belief in or behavior guided by religious (or other) conceptions (...) of the supersensible as “fanaticism” (Schwärmerei). By comparison to many Enlightenment figures, Kant’s understanding of the relation between the human presumption to knowledge of the supersensible and the deliverances of reason is more sympathetic to the claims of religious belief and more qualified in advocating the corrective power of reason against it. I argue that Kant’s conception of fanaticism – its origins, motivations, and the nature of its error – reflects this more qualified endorsement of reason. I suggest that by contrast to many of his predecessors and contemporaries Kant does not treat fanaticism as expressing or originating wholly from sensible emotions or interests, opposed to and “overpowering” reason. Rather, though sensibility (including emotional sensibility) is central to his account of fanaticism, Kant holds that the problematic fanatical stance incorporates and depends on rational projections or aspirations, particularly those of practical reason. Moreover, Kant’s distinction between theoretical and practical reason generates an interesting, dual account of fanaticism: theoretical fanaticism, a kind of cognitive error, and practical fanaticism, a specifically practical error in our relation to the supersensible. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XX, Number 2, November 1994, pp. 179-194 Symposium A version of this paper was presented at the symposium on A Progress of Sentiments by Annette C. Baier, held at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Los Angeles, March 1994. On an Unorthodox Account of Hume's Moral Psychology RACHEL COHON One can learn a great deal about Hume's Treatise from Annette Baier's fascinating (...) book, A Progress of Sentiments.1 It is in places dazzling, in others revelatory, occasionally puzzling, and everywhere interesting. Having said that, I proceed to criticize one aspect of it. Belief and the Passions My topic is Baier's interpretation of Hume's moral psychology. First I sketch out the striking differences between Baier's View of Hume's moral psychology and what I call the Standard View. Then I consider some of Baier's reasons for her unorthodox reading. I argue that Baier's View of Hume's moral psychology is motivated in part by a particular, unstated understanding of Hume's theory of the passions. As a consequence of this, I argue, Baier denies Hume the use of an especially strong argument against the moral rationalists' theory of motivation and morality, for that strong anti-rationalist argument (sometimes called the influence argument) depends upon a support that is incompatible with Hume's theory of the passions as Baier implicitly understands it. But without the influence argument, Hume's case against the moral rationalists would be much weaker. The relevant portion of the Standard View, on the other hand, makes better sense of Hume's campaign against Samuel Clarke and others, because it embraces the support Hume offers for the influence argument. So, in this one respect, I shall argue that a portion of the Rachel Cohon is at the Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford CA 94305 USA. 180 Rachel Cohon Standard View of Hume's moral psychology is superior to Baier's View. But whether we should reject Baier's View in favor of the relevant portion of the Standard View depends, of course, upon whether we can consistently reject the unstated interpretation of Hume's theory of the passions on which Baier's View seems to be based. Baier explicitly sees her version of Hume's moral psychology as shaped by the account of the passions in Book II. And Baier's discussion of the role of belief in the causation and individuation of the passions is illuminating. It helps guard against a common oversimplification of Hume's claim about the motivating power of reason. Baier reminds us that passions are impressions of reflection, and hence must be introduced in the mind by an impression or an idea; i.e., each passion is caused by certain ideas or impressions. Passions are "thought-caused" and "idea-mediated" (160). Anger, for example, "is always directed at someone for some perceived insult, injury or harm" (161). It has a "subject" or cause, the injury the person is thought to have done one. In one place Baier refers to the causes of passions as their "appropriate reasons" (164). The causes are "thoughts about what is or is likely to become the case" (161). For something to be a passion at all rather than a mere pleasure or pain, some idea must be present to cause it. Passions do, indeed, have their hedonic components, such as the two pleasures included in pride. But for pride to be the passion it is, rather than some other, "one must believe the fine thing to be one's own" (161). A particular belief is what identifies the passion. Even desire is influenced by a belief or idea, and subsequently is often called "preference " (164). Thus, since reason produces beliefs, and beliefs are the crucial, identifying causes of passions, reason has a thorough-going influence on passion. And since passions are what move us to act, reason provides indispensable causal input into volition and action. It is easy but inaccurate to describe Hume as saying that belief, or reason, does not cause action. Furthermore, besides having a characteristic cause, many passions have an intentional object distinct from their cause. For anger, this "object... (shrink)

Socrates' aim in the Republic is to show that being just is crucial for happiness. In Republic IV, Socrates argues that the just individual is one in whom each part of the soul or psyche performs its proper function, with the result that the individual attains psychic harmony. Commentators have worried, however, that this account of what it is to be just has little to do with being just in the ordinary sense of the term, which involves acting with regard (...) for the good of others. In this essay, I describe three attempts to show that there is a connection between Socrates' account of justice and justice in the ordinary sense of the term and I raise criticisms of each. I then outline my own approach, which emphasizes the importance of good relations with others for happiness. (shrink)

In the second of the UM, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life", Nietzsche delivers a rare and lengthy encomium to the traditional Platonic-Aristotelian virtue of justice. "In truth," he says, "no one has a greater claim to our veneration than he who possesses the drive to and strength for justice. For the highest and rarest virtues are united and concealed in justice as in an unfathomable ocean that receives streams and rivers from all sides and takes them (...) into itself".1 This claim seems to echo, or at least allude to, the thesis of Plato's Republic that justice is the virtue in which the other virtues are united, each in its proper place in the... (shrink)

"I shall speak of ghost, of flame, and of ashes." These are the first words of Jacques Derrida's lecture on Heidegger. It is again a question of Nazism—of what remains to be thought through of Nazism in general and of Heidegger's Nazism in particular. It is also "politics of spirit" which at the time people thought—they still want to today—to oppose to the inhuman. "Derrida's ruminations should intrigue anyone interested in Post-Structuralism..... This study of Heidegger is a fine example of (...) how Derrida can make readers of philosophical texts notice difficult problems in almost imperceptible details of those texts."—David Hoy, London Review of Books "Will a more important book on Heidegger appear in our time? No, not unless Derrida continues to think and write in his spirit.... Let there be no mistake: this is not merely a brilliant book on Heidegger, it is thinking in the grand style."—David Farrell Krell, _Research in Phenomenology_ "The analysis of Heidegger is brilliant, provocative, elusive."—Peter C. Hodgson, Religious Studies Review. (shrink)

The process of allorecognition consists of an ability to discriminate self from non‐self. This discrimination is used either to identify non‐self cells and reject them (“non‐self histocompatibility”) or to identify self cells and reject them (as in the avoidance of self‐fertilization by hermaphrodites (“self incompatibility”). The molecular basis governing these two distinct systems has been studied recently in hermaphroditic ascidian urochordates. Harada et al.1 postulated two highly polymorphic self‐incompatibility loci, Themis (A and B), that are transcribed from both strands, forward (...) to yield sperm (s‐) trans‐membrane antigen, and reverse to yield the egg vitelline coat (v‐) receptor. De Tomaso et al.2 characterized a candidate histocompatibility locus, encoding a highly variable immunoglobulin. Nyholm et al.3 isolated its candidate allorecognition receptor, fester. Only a minute similarity was found in the structure of the genes involved. It appears that ascidian harbor two very separate types of labeling and recognition genetic systems: one for self and the other for non‐self. BioEssays 30:1048–1051, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Abstract The principal aim of this paper is to give a positive analysis of self-deception. I argue that self-deception is a species ?self-emplotment?. Through narrative self-emplotment one groups the events of one's life thematically in order to understand and monitor oneself. I argue that self-emplotment is an unextraordinary feature of mental life that is a precondition of agency. Self-emplotment, however, proceeds according to certain norms, some of which provide apparent justification for self-deceptive activity. A secondary aim of the paper is (...) to sketch the common characteristics between self-deception and self-knowledge. The framework of self-emplotment from which self-deception can emerge is also the framework that delivers self-knowledge; to the extent that the activity of self-emplotment is partially constitutive of what it means to possess self-knowledge, the self-deceiver may be closer to a state of self-knowledge than the person who fails to engage in significant introspective narrative. (shrink)

The majority of midwives in the UK are employed within the NHS. They are legally bound to fulfil their contractual obligations to their employers. At the same time they are professionally mandated to interpret and act on the UKCC's Code of professional conduct. Midwives have always maintained that they are autonomous practitioners, and the Code is written in a way that endorses this belief. Underlying the Code is the assumption that midwives have moral and professional freedom to act on its (...) imperatives. However, midwives' claim to autonomy is flawed, and therefore the Code's claim to be a source of empowerment is also flawed. Underlying the difficulties is a conflict derived from the imposition of a deontologically-based professional Code on to a workforce that is constrained within and employed by the utilitarian-based NHS. (shrink)

This volume offers a comprehensive guide to the extensive corpus of Jean-Luc Marion’s ideas, including a discussion of contemporary French phenomenology and critical appraisal of Marion’s ideas by leading scholars in the field. The contributors apply Marion’s thought to various fields of study, including theology, art, literature and psychology.

I set the stage for Socrates and Aristophanes’ alliance by beginning with Hegel’s question, what is the object of art?, in the context of his analysis of ancient Greek “art-religion.” Hegel traces the shifting object of art through a variety of artistic practices before arriving at comedy, which he identifies as the last stage of Greek aesthetic life. He finally asks, what is the object of comedy? Unlike other artistic practices that are positively defined by their created object or creative (...) activity, ancient comedy appears to be purely destructive, terminating anything that might be traditionally recognizable as an object of art. Hegel points to Aristophanes and Socrates as representing two sides of the defacement of the object of art-religion as such. Moving beyond Hegel, I turn to Aristophanes and Plato to consider how in the performative destruction of the object of aesthetic and philo- sophical reflection, something slips into being that may be identified as the phantom form of the Subject. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Little Way:Ferdinand Ulrich on AccidentsRachel M. ColemanWe live in a material reality. Obviously it is not the case that we live in a merely material reality, but it is worth remembering that we are corporeal substances given to be in a corporeal reality. Our materiality informs every aspect of our being, everything about us—including how we come to know.The German philosopher Ferdinand Ulrich never forgets this about the (...) human being or the reality in which the human is given to be—indeed, Ulrich, like his intellectual mentor and constant dialogue partner Thomas Aquinas, is a realist. That is to say that, like Thomas, Ulrich is always thinking about the world as it is given to man to inhabit and understand. This then includes thinking about matter, which, because of its status as lowest rung on the ladder of creation, is often overlooked in our thinking. Our materiality, with all of its implications for man, the world, and the task of man that is philosophy—that is, thinking and knowing being itself—is a touchstone for Ulrich's metaphysics and indeed all of his work.1Ulrich's dense and textured metaphysics can be approached in many ways, but perhaps none is so crucial as his attention to the small and seemingly insignificant, which is why he gives so much time and attention to matter throughout his corpus—for what could be more insignificant than that which does not exist in itself? Ulrich's attention to matter, however, is not simply in the speculative mode, wondering about the nature of potentia pura (though this is also included), but rather this kind of speculation leads [End Page 377] Ulrich to thinking through the implications of materiality for man's being and knowing. One of these is what Ulrich refers to repeatedly throughout Homo Abyssus, his great work of metaphysics and meta-anthropology, as "the little way." In the first chapter of that book, Ulrich writes:The light of being, since it doesn't cling to itself or allow reason to come to an end "next to" God, is therefore precisely what compels speculative reason to transcend beings into the absolute ground. This act of transcendence enraptures reason, which has been illuminated by being, elevating reason into the light of absolute truth, while reason precisely thereby enters onto the "little way" in the multiplicity of finite being.2According to Ulrich, in order to know and understand being itself, or "absolute truth," as quoted just above, human reason must enter onto this "little way," which can be reached only "in the multiplicity of finite being."The materiality of the world and the multiplicity of finite being therein have everything to do with each other, and Ulrich claims that, in order to know and understand absolute truth or being itself, precisely this multiplicity must be our starting point. Already then, at the beginning of Homo Abyssus, Ulrich draws our attention to the significance of matter.Ulrich receives this phrase, "the little way," from none other than St. Thérèse of Lisieux, who, in accepting her littleness, so to speak, not as a burden but as a gift, was given to work great acts.3 We have a clue already, [End Page 378] then, for beginning to understand how Ulrich conceives of matter and multiplicity: as that which, though nothing in itself, allows us to know the greatest truths—indeed, the "absolute truth." [End Page 379]Here we cannot explore every aspect of what Ulrich means when he uses the phrase "the little way," nor can we outline the entirety of how Ulrich's thinking about matter and materiality informs his metaphysics.4 We can, however, approach this topic in Ulrich's thinking through one particular implication of material being: accidents, or accidental being. Accidents do not subsist in themselves, but rather only in another—that is, substance—and as such, according to Ulrich, often get passed over in our thinking in favor of what we think of as more important subjects. And yet, in a certain sense, accidents are all we ever encounter in the world: while the tree could theoretically be any color at all, it... (shrink)

The professional mining engineer has a number of different duties. He must: produce engineering designs, meet the production requirements set by the mining operation he works for, ensure efficient cooperation between the different departments in a mine, and he is responsible for mine planning. Also, and very importantly, he is responsible for meeting high safety standards and ensuring that his mine is as injury and fatality free as possible. However, it is unfortunately the case that accidents do occur in mines, (...) and that miners are sometimes injured or even killed. Such tragedies raise questions about whether the mining engineer bears some responsibility for the injuries or deaths. In this paper, we argue that the engineer does bear responsibility, but that depending on the circumstances surrounding any particular accident, ascriptions of moral responsibility do not always mean that the engineer is morally blameworthy. We conclude that professional accountability and moral responsibility require that the mining engineer take practical steps to ensure that high safety standards are upheld, and that, when accidents occur, steps are taken to identify the causes so that similar tragedies can be avoided in the future. (shrink)

The authors mark the twentieth anniversary of the classic study by Weitzman et al., which found considerable gender stereotyping in picture books for preschool children, by replicating and extending their study with an updated sample that includes books by Black illustrators. The authors find evidence that female characters and female relationships receive considerably more attention in recent books by both conventional illustrators and Black illustrators than they did in the late 1960s. They also find, consistent with the liberal feminist aims (...) of Weitzman et al., evidence that male and female characters are shown in a more egalitarian fashion than they were in the late 1960s in books by mainstream authors. Finally, they discover that, consistent with the aims of recent Black feminist theorists, Black illustrators are more apt than others to highlight women's involvement in an ethic of caring and an ethic of personal accountability. (shrink)

Chronic diseases are major causes of health inequalities. Community nurses can potentially make large contributions to chronic illness prevention and management in Israel but may be obstructed by professional dominance of physicians. However, insufficient research exists about community nursing in Israel, and how it may differ from other countries. This study aims to document chronic disease‐related community nursing roles in Israel, identify changes and trends in community nursing roles that may increase social justice, and understand how the roles and trends (...) in community health nursing in Israel may differ from developments in other countries. In‐depth interviews were performed with 55 Israeli health system professionals, and 692 nurse care‐givers were asked open‐ended questions. Interview answers were analyzed to find themes and trends. The study found that community nurse roles in Israel have expanded, especially for chronic disease control. Commonalities exist with countries such as the United States and the UK, albeit with important differences. However, continued conflicts with physicians exist, which can limit nurses' contributions to reducing health inequalities. Community nurses' importance is growing. Enabling them to overcome professional dominance and improve chronic disease control can help reduce health inequalities in Israel and elsewhere. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that theory in psychology need not be mystifying to non-theorists. I use feminist postmodern theory and the discourses of masculinity to demonstrate how theory can facilitate the exploration of questions and reveal what has been marginalized and obscured. My premise is further illustrated by an examination of the male sex drive discourse. I suggest in conclusion that the question in any theory is always about the choice of question. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

This article establishes that our perception of reality is subjective and undeliverable. It is an upshot of the intention by which we use our desires. The article states that we have two paths by which to advance, that of pain (our current) and that of pleasant, and quicker progress, called "the Path of Light." The article also asserts that in Kabbalah, spirituality means altruism, and corporeality means egoism. Although both pertain to reception, the difference is determined by the objective of (...) such reception. Lastly, it describes the process of becoming a kabbalist through books, social environment, and the teacher's guidance. (shrink)